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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

MAX E. BIRCH and FONTELLA BIRCH,
his wife,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
V'S.

Case No.

8822
FORREST W. FULLER and JUDITH
HYDE FULLER, his wife; KENNETH
W. JUDD and RUBY F. JUDD, his wife,

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgmenlt granted plaintiff-respondents by i!he D:i:Sttriot Court of Duchesne County, State of
Utah, againSit the defendant-appe!lla'll!ts £m trespass 'and slander
of title.
On or 'ab0111t January 31, 1957, the respondenll:s entered into
a Uniform Real Estate Contract w:iJth de£endanJt Robert E. Sather
(Plaintiff's' Exhibit "A") whe["eby the responde'll!ts agreed to sell
and Sather agreed to buy the ranch of respondenlbs. On or about
\1aruh 31, 1957, Sat!heT and 'the respo1J11derrts executed a mortgage
:iJn favor of Seour:iJty Loan and Finance OorporaJtion (Plaintiffs'
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Exhibit "C"). ConCllrr'ently t!herewith the respondents and
Sa1t!her, Judd and Fuller entered inlto the fol1owing !agreement:
"This is to acknowledge that K·ennetlh W. Judd and
Forres•t W. Fuller agree to make all paymerllts upon
the foregoing note and to save Robert R. Salt!her completely harmless therefrom. Max E. Birch rand Fontella
Birch agn~e to credit !the principal·and inTerest of said
note upon their U rrifurm Real Eslf:are Contmct with
Sa1t!her, ood Sather agrees to assign all of his inrerest in
and to said contract rto Fuller and Judd at such time
as the foregoing note to Security Loan rand F,inaJnce is
paid in fuH together wirth interest 11hereon." (Plainitiffs'
E)Chibit 'T').
On or about !the 23rd day of April, 1957, appellrantt Fuller paid
the sum of $290.00 ttn the fioonce company in acoordance wi'l!h
said agreement and had the Sather- Birch real estate OOilltracl:
recorded. On or about May 1, 1957, Max E. Birch and Sather
enltered inlto an option agreement :for the same .Jand described
in rthe prior Uniform Rool Estate Contract (Plaintiffs' E:rlribit
"E") without notice to any of the ~ parties. Subsequent
thereto, on or about May 4, 1957, defendallllt Sall:!her executed a
release of the Uniform Real E·state Contract (Pllainltiffs' Exhibit
"B").
Subsequent to the ·execution of the Sather-Biroh option,
appellanlt Kennetlh W. Judd and defendant F. A. Hatch entered
upon rhe property of respondents, buHt corrals and fences tihereon and peacefully engaged in varied agricultu!ra.!l pursu!irts with
the knowledge of respondents and withOUit objection on tlhe
part of respondents. Responden1ts' admi!l!ted reason for their
lack of objection was the Sarther- Birch option agreemen!t (Transscript, Birah D 7-9, and C 53-54).
At the close of Plaintiffs' case defendants moved for dismi'S'sa:l and when dmlied entered a stipulation into !the record as
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to what defen~' wimesses wouLd testify to. The Court dismissed ~as to tJhe defendants Sather upon motion of !reSpondents
(ReOOTd, 47); found :that ..no money judgmenrt is to be entered
against 'the defendant, F. A. Haltch."; and entered judgment
against appelhmts for $128.00 "actual damages" 'and $500.00 atttomey's fee for slander of tide, and, $877.00 less $43'5.0 set_,off
for trespass. From this judgment and tlhe order of the Court
denying appelants' motion to dismis:s appellants appea1.
1

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS' FIRST CAUSE OF
A:CTION AND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT THEREUNDER
FOR SLANDER OF TITLE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING 'RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT UPON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
TRESPASS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS' FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION AND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT THEREUNDER FOR SLANDER OF TITLE.
"The elemen1tary principle ·is wel:l settled lthaJt malice,
or implli'ed, is an es,senJtial element in actions for
slander of title . . . It ~follows 'that no 'action wi:ll lie
where 'a statement in shl!Illder of ltit!le or property, althoug~h false, was made in good fai!th wil!ih probable
caus;e fioc beHeving ~t, ... Again, one who ihaJs reasonable
expi~ess
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ground Ito suppose himself possess·ed of rthe legal title
to lands, o'l· an equiJty ~therein which would enabl'e him
:to maintain an action for a conveyance, is not Hable in
damages in an action fur ·slander of tii?le." 33 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 313, 314, Section .348.

"M,a:lice or want of good fari:th and waTilt of probabLe cause are es,senlti'al elements of the action of slander
of title, and damages oanniQit be recovered where :i1t appears !that such erement is absent. Where defendant
acts in pursuance of a bona fide claim which he is asserting honestly, although wi'thout right ... such defendant
will not be penalized in damages for asserting such
bona fide cLaim in good faitth." WARD v. MID-WEST
& GULF CO., 97 OKLA. 252, 223 P.l70.
"Had pl:aintifif :inttroduced evidence showing iflhe tax
deed ro be patently void on its £ace, or had he ffitlabJished thrut defendant ha:d conspired with (another) ...
or had he inrtroduced any other evidence indicalting :the
mootgage was recorded in bad fiailt'h to cloud plaintiffs'
title he migftlt have established his right to recover such
damages as we recoveraHle under a theory of slander
of title, but n01thing of tfuis kind appears in tf!he record."
DRAPER v. J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., (Utah
Supreme Court) 204 P. 2d 826.
There is notlling in the record to indicate that plaintiffs'
Ex!hibit "I", the 'agreemenrt of Sather to assign m appellants, or
the lis pendens ba•S'ed i!he.t"'On is patently void, and no evidence
in 1tlhe r.eco'l1d to indicate that the lis pendens "·as filed in bad
hitlh. In fact ilt is manifestly apparent f1rom the record ·tha:t
Sather and Birch, having full knowledge of tiDe equitable intei~es't of the appellanlts acquired by virtue of the agreement set
fm1~h in said E:x~hibit •T', and tthe subsequent pa~·ment made by
Fuller, coi11Spired to defea1t sudh interest and tha·t !the ·lis pendens
was filed in good fai1th to pr01tect such equitty. Tthe record would
not permi t any contrary connotation €'VE"n if tlle agreement were
1
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declared to be null and void and 'such dedanuti:on was supported
by some •smadl shred of evidence in the ·reoord.
Absent any showing of bad ·Faith on the part of ,tfue appellants and any lmowledge on their part ·that the terms of such
agreement !had been lawfully abrogated rllere wa1s no evidence
to support I1espondents' :conlrention that appdllanltls s•landered
their title wilt!hout oause and •such oaUJse of action ~should have
been dismissed.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT UPON THE SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TRESPASS.
"In an action of trespass the board rules of evidence
The principle
is fund"cllmeniflal that the burden of proof in any oause
rests upon the par1ty who aSisents the affirmative of an
issue ... Where several persons are engaged togett:her
in a common purpose and a 'trespass is committed by
one oc more of 'them, assent t!hereto by !the otheT'S is
presumed only if lthe eommon des:ign is umawful. Where
th object 'to be accomplished is a lawful orne, ass:ent is
a mUJt1tler of fact itJo be proved. 52 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 889, Trespass, Sootions 75, 76, 77.
in ciVIil actions . . . are 'applioab1e; ...

The reoord is en!t:iTely barren of .any evidence that the appellants, Judith Hyde Ful1er, Ruby F. Judd, and Fowes1t W. FuJ-

ler, ever entered upon the land of rthe respondents and/ or ever
perfomned ·any ams vesul!fling in the damage complained of.
Likwise is the record bawen of any shred of evidence t!hat the
oo-defendanlts Kernnetlili W. Judd, F. A. Hattah and/oT t!heir employees WeJ:'Ie aoting unde!I' the co!llltr!Qil, at the direction, fior the
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benefit, or wi~h lthe ass1ent: of said 1t1hree named appellants. Nor
is there any evidence in the recovd that any of tihe panties wme
aOb.irng in conoeJ.'It one with 1the other. "Wil:rtle tile plaintiff need
not proV!e his oruse beyond a J.'leasonable doubt, evidence affovding only 'a brus1s fur mere speculaJtion and conjooture as to the
caus1e of pl ainltiffs' injuries is wholly insufficient as a basis upon
which to J.'lest a verdict fur damages." 52 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 892, Trespatss, Section80.
1

In dris connection it is significant to note t!h3!t !the trial Judge
fOIUnd wi~th vespect to F. A. Hatch, upon .faots much stronger
tlha.n exist against these respondents, rthat he was not Hable for a
money judgmoot in trespass. I•t is also significanlt to note thwt
fue case againlSit the co-defendants Salther, named in all of the
agreemenltJs with respondents, was dismissed upon the motion of
respondentJs. H tthel'1e is any basis for liability against respondents
Judi,th H~de Fuller, Ruby F. Judd, and Forrest W. Fuller, it
moot, if ·at a:H, exislt outside of the record.
With. respeot to the appellant, Kenneth W. Judd, ilt must
be ·admirtted 1t!hat he entei!ed upon the land of :respondents, but
wit!h tTt~e oons·ent of respondems. (Tvansoript, Birch, D 7, 8, 9;
C 53-54). In BOBO v. YOUNG et 'al, 61 So. 2d 814, it was stated,
" . . . if an awner of land ·consents for anotlher Ito go upon it
atnJd ·t!he other 1ac'hs on that oonsent and incurs labor and expense
in connection lllherewilth, tthat consent cannot be later withdrawn,
nor is the other party Hable in damages for trespass."
The responderlits made no arlltempt to distinguish between
the damages cau~ed by appellant Judd and the defentdarnt Hatch,
and fmther made no effu11t Ito dist:ingui~h between damage done
priOT to July 4, 1957, when respondents ordered Hattch off the
propffilty (Transcript, Bwch, 4 14-15) and damages for subsequent .enltries. l1t may thus be observed tiliat from the record
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only pure conjecture rus to what part of the damages Kenne1th W.
Judd was directly flespons,ible for, 'if any, and as t10 wiha:t damages, if any, accrUied ~ruEter July 4, could ,dJetennine any
Habi1ity. Conjectur"e and spec u 1at ion upon ttth'e part of
the trier of the faahs should not mplruce p1a:inltiffs' burden of
proof. Since the Court appar'oottly £0ll[)jd some exCtllse for 'f'lhe
admi!tted and proved trespaJs'ses of Hatch it then becomes imperative to de~termine which, if any, of the damages were caused
by Judd or ihis agOOJts and which by H~ah, £or ..wbJen rtwo or
more to:rt-fea:sms aoting i~n~depoodenit1y of 1eadh oltlher inflid an
injUT)' ... Ollie Oa.Illllat be held liable for ,flhe ·trespwsses of the
other . . . " 521 AMERrCAN JURISPRUDENCE, TIOOSpruss,
861, SectiJOin 31. From lt'he record it becomes manifestly 'apparent
that no such dleterminaltion is possible.
CONCLUSION
The faotls :in 'l:!h:is oase do not appear 1to be malteri:ally in conflict. The erllibits were introduced 'and idenll:ified by respondents and ,aftl rtestirnoo.y referred to herein was from witnesses
called by respondents. The respoDJdooltl.s have failen futaly short
of provmg 'eilther t!he elemenJts of slander of tilt'le or with any
slight certalinty facts nooesg~ary to 'hold appellanlts 'nable in trespass.

li\

The denial by the DiSitrict Courtt of appellaJnJts' motion to
dismi·ss 'and the judgmoot granrted were in error and shou:ld be
re¥ersed.

RlespectfuHy

subm~tted,

GORDON I. HYDE and FORREST
W. FULLER, Afitomeys for

Defe:ndaJI1lt-Appellimts.
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